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Abstract 
The paper strives to postulate a possible optimal policy path for a social planner who is 
concerned with managing the stock of an accumulative pollutant within the society. Using 
Hamiltonian functions in a dynamic optimizing problem, the paper was able to show that the 
policy path that will minimize the damages of an accumulative pollutant depends on the steady 
state of the accumulative pollutant as compared to the level of the accumulative pollutant 
present within the society. This relationship between the steady state and level of accumulative 
pollutant determines both abatement levels and pollution tax: policy tool kits for the social 
planner. The paper concludes that the social planner should advocate for a tax regime that is 
below the steady state tax level which will imply lower optimal abatement levels initially. The tax 
can then be increased over time to ensure increased abetment of the stock pollutant. 
 
Keywords: Accumulative Pollutant, Dynamic Optimization, Pollution, Social Welfare, Pollution 
Abatement, Environmental Abatement Tax 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio de 
Janeiro in 1992 recognized the pressing environment and development problems of the world 
and, through adoption of Agenda 21, produced a global program of action for sustainable 
development into the 21st century (Sachs and Warner, 1995). After a decade known as the 
rhetoric decade, the World Summit for Sustainable Development (WSSD), held in 
Johannesburg in August 2002, made it clear that urgent formulation and elaboration of national 
strategies for sustainable development are necessary. The main result of the summit was that 
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one of the three pillars of sustainable development - the environment - is seriously damaged 
because of the distortions placed on it by the actions of human population. The collapse of the 
environmental pillar is a serious possibility if action is not taken as a matter of urgency to 
address human impacts, which have left: increased pollutants in the atmosphere, vast areas of 
land resources degraded, depleted and degraded forests, biodiversity under threat, reduction of 
the fresh water resources, depleted marine resources (Dasgupta and Maeler, 1994). 
Sustainability does not mean that resources must remain untouched; rather it means the 
rates of use of their services must be chosen so as not to jeopardize future generations. 
Services are both in the sense of inputs for the production and consumption system and in the 
sense of dump for residuals (Faucheux et al, 1996). The Justification of this paper is premised 
on the need for providing a postulate for the social planner, that includes, a policy road map 
whereby sustainable progress can be achieved with minimum harm to the environment as well 
as ensuring societal welfare.  
This paper is primarily concerned with the role of environmental economics in assessing 
how society can sustain its economy and environment. This paper will abstract from reality by 
using a case study to draw policy implications for managing a cumulative inorganic pollutant. In 
essence, the paper strives to examine the waste products or residuals from production and 
consumption and how to reduce or mitigate the flow of residuals so they have less damage on 
the natural environment and depletion of natural capital. According to Solow (1993) 
accumulative pollutants are a major source of pollution in the society because they stay in the 
environment in nearly the same amounts as they are emitted. Thus, their total stock thus builds 
up over time as these pollutants are released into the environment each year. The rest of the 
paper is arranged as follows: in (2) the paper provides some literature review on pollutant 
abatement and in (3) the paper defines and explains what accumulative pollutants are. In (4) the 
paper uses a Hamiltonian function to explain the evolution of the pollutant stock while, (5) and 
(6) derives the steady state and postulates policy implications of the Hamiltonian function 
respectively. In (7) the paper espouses management strategies for the social planner and in (8) 
conclusions are drawn. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Providing a feasible policy prescription for managing pollutants is the goal of environmental 
management. The literature on pollutant management is vast, with policy prescriptions ranging 
from the provision of an abatement tax regime to the advocates of a political economy solution. 
For example, Moslener and Requate (2009) investigated optimal abatement strategies for 
cumulative and interacting pollutants. They showed that different decay rates can cause non-
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monotonic behaviour in the optimal paths of emissions, the aggregate level of pollution, and 
even the relative optimal price for emissions. Their findings contrast strikingly with the case of a 
single pollutant. Their results add to the scepticism existing about whether the concept of global 
warming potential is a useful indicator for the optimal relative abatement of different GHGs over 
time. In fact, they showed that a constant index suitable for comparing dynamically different 
pollutants with respect to their economic harmfulness does not exist. 
Moslener and Requate (2007) also analysed a dynamic multi-pollutant problem where 
abatement costs of several pollutants are not separable. The pollutants they studied could be 
either technological substitutes or complements. Optimal emission paths are found to be 
qualitatively different for substitutes and complements. In particular they found out that optimal 
emission paths need not be monotonic, even for highly symmetric pollutants and they described 
a comparatively simple method to implement the optimal path without explicitly knowing its 
shape.  
Requate (2005) surveyed and discussed recent developments on the incentives 
provided by environmental policy instruments for both adoption and development of advanced 
abatement technology. The main conclusion to be drawn from this work is that under 
competitive conditions market based instruments usually perform better than command and 
control. Moreover, taxes may provide stronger long term incentives than tradable permits if the 
regulator is myopic. If the government can anticipate new technology or is able to react on it 
optimally, regulatory policies by virtue of administered prices (taxes) and policies by setting 
quantities (issuing tradable permits) are (almost) equivalent.  
Gonzalez (2007) argued that under certain conditions (including path dependence and 
lock-in), policies and measures leading to a cost-effective GHG emissions mitigation in the short 
term may not allow reaching long-term emissions targets at the lowest possible cost, that is, 
they might not be cost-effective in the long term. Simple models and a numerical simulation are 
provided to show this possible conflict between static and dynamic efficiency, which points out 
to the need to combine different instruments, some aiming at short-term cost-efficiency (such as 
incentive-based environmental policy) and others at encouraging dynamic cost reductions (such 
as technology/innovation policy). 
Unold and Requate (2001) showed that for pollution control with imperfect information 
about aggregate abatement costs, a combination consisting of free permits and a menu of call 
options for additional permits with different striking prices. Accordingly, appropriately choosing 
permits and corresponding striking prices the regulator can approximate the marginal damage 
function arbitrarily well. Kuosmanen, Bijsterbosch and Dellink (2009) stressed the 
disadvantages of abatement policies. They argued that assessing the benefits of climate 
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policies is complicated due to ancillary benefits: abatement of greenhouse gases also reduces 
local air pollution. They conducted efficiency analysis of ten alternative timing strategies, taking 
into account the ancillary benefits. They concluded that if one is only interested in GHG 
abatement at the lowest economic cost, then equal reduction of GHGs over time is preferred. If 
society is willing to pay a premium for higher ancillary benefits, an early mid-intensive reduction 
strategy is optimal. 
Leandri (2009) presented a model of optimal flow pollution control considering explicitly 
the dynamics of the corresponding assimilative capacity. His analysis shows that a minimum 
level of initial assimilative capacity is necessary to prevent its optimal extinction. He then allows 
for the restoration of assimilative capacity and characterizes the conditions under which this 
option frees the optimal policy from the dependency on the initial conditions. In both cases our 
results call for environmental standards based on the shadow price of assimilative capacity that 
are stricter than the static optimum commonly used in flow pollution control.  
Also, Requate and Unold (2003) investigated incentives through environmental policy 
instruments to adopt advanced abatement technology. They study the case where the regulator 
makes long-term commitments to policy levels and does not anticipate arrival of new 
technology. The authors show that taxes provide stronger incentives than permits, auctioned 
and free permits offer identical incentives, and standards may give stronger incentives than 
permits.  
Holland (2012) argued that the best emissions tax or emissions cap may be an inferior 
instrument under incomplete regulation (leakage). Without leakage, an intensity standard 
(regulating emissions per unit of output) is inferior due to an implicit output subsidy. This 
inefficiency can be eliminated by an additional consumption tax. With leakage, an intensity 
standard can dominate the optimal emissions tax, since the implicit output subsidy prevents 
leakage. The addition of a consumption tax improves an intensity standard's efficiency, may 
prevent leakage, and may be efficient. Comparing intensity standards to output-based updating 
showed that the latter dominates if updating is sufficiently flexible. 
Using historical data, Baryshnikov (2010) studied pollution abatement and environmental 
equity in a dynamic panel model using data for 234 plants in the US pulp and paper industry 
observed over the period 1985–1997. He finds some environmental inequity with respect to the 
children (under 6 years) and adults with no high school diploma. Our findings show no evidence 
of environmental inequity against African–Americans, Hispanics, other minority races, or the 
poor. 
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ACCUMULATIVE POLLUTANTS: WHAT ARE THEY? 
As already emphasized, studies in environmental economics examine the waste products or 
residuals from production and consumption and how to reduce or mitigate the flow of residuals 
so they have less damage on the natural environment and depletion of natural capital. 
Production and consumption create all types of materials residuals that may be emitted into the 
air or water or disposed of on land. The list is incredibly long: sulphur dioxide, volatile organic 
compounds, toxic solvents, animal manure, pesticides, particulate matter of all types, waste 
building materials, heavy metals, and so on. Waste energy, in the form of heat and noise, and 
radioactivity, which has characteristics of both material and energy, are also important 
production residuals. Consumers are also responsible for enormous quantities of residuals, 
chief among which are domestic sewage and automobile emissions. All materials in consumer 
goods must eventually end up as residuals, even though some may be recycled along the way. 
These are the source of large quantities of solid waste, as well as hazardous materials like toxic 
chemicals found in items such as pesticides, batteries, paint, and used oil. 
One simple and important dimension of environmental pollutants is whether they 
accumulate over time or tend to dissipate soon after being emitted. The classic case of a non-
accumulative pollutant is noise; as long as the source operates, noise is emitted into the 
surrounding air, but as soon as the source is shut down, the noise stops. At the other end of the 
spectrum we have accumulative pollutants that stay in the environment in nearly the same 
amounts as they are emitted. Their total stock thus builds up over time as these pollutants are 
released into the environment each year. Radioactive waste, for example, decays over time but 
at such a slow rate in relation to human lifespan that for all intents and purposes it will be with 
us permanently. Another accumulative pollutant is plastics. The search for a degradable plastic 
has been going on for decades and, while gains have been made, most plastics decay very 
slowly by human standards; thus, what we dispose of will be in the environment permanently 
(Asheim et al, 2001). 
 
MANAGING A STOCK OF ACCUMULATIVE POLLUTANT 
A stock pollutant is a pollutant that accumulates over time, and the damage it causes at a point 
in time is a function of how much has accumulated to that point (Dasgupta, 2001). For this 
paper, as already mentioned, the focus will be on inorganic pollutant / waste. The method of 
study employed is dynamic optimization (see. Cass and Shell, 1976; Fabbri and Gozzi, 2008; 
and Kamiean and Schwartz, 2012). The choice of dynamic optimization to espouse possible 
measures on managing an accumulative pollutant is premised on the characteristic of the social 
problem of: 
© Onyimadu 
Licensed under Creative Common     Page 6 
 
1. Managing the stock of accumulative pollutants.  
2. Decisions in one time period will affect opportunities and payoffs in the future.   
3. All decisions are functions instead of single values. These decisions are time paths of 
actions over some time frame.  
 
The fundamental problem for the social planner is to find a control which minimize or maximize 
a certain objective, subject to constraints on the evolution of the stock of accumulative pollutant. 
To do this, the paper employs a current – value Hamiltonian function. 
 
Notation 
S – Stock of accumulative pollutant 
X – Potential aggregate effects:  this is aggregate effect of the pollutant to the society without 
any control. The portion of production or consumption residuals that are placed in the 
environment, sometimes directly, sometimes after treatment 
A – Abatement, i.e. Reduction or loss in welfare due to the presence of the pollutant (example: 
pollution tax) 
(X-A) – Aggregate flow of pollutant  
g – Percentage of the stock of the pollutant that decays in a time period, g ∈(0,1).  
The state equation is 
Ṡ =  𝑋 −  𝐴 −  𝑔𝑆.       1 
Which showed the evolution of the accumulative pollutant over time 
Let:  
D (S) – aggregate damage function with D′ >0 and D′′ >0. Damages are the negative impacts 
produced by environmental pollution—on people in the form of health effects, visual 
degradation, and so on, and on elements of the ecosystem through things like the disruption of 
ecological linkages or species extinctions 
C (A) – aggregate abatement costs with C′ >0 and C′′ >0.  
i – discount rate held constant over [0,∞].  
The social planner’s objective is to minimize the present value of the flow of total costs—
damage plus abatement costs:  
 Minimize        ∫ [𝐷(𝑆) + 𝐶 (𝐴)е− 𝑖𝑡
∞
0      
2 
 Subject to Ṡ =  𝑋 −  𝐴 −  𝑔𝑆     3 
𝑆 (0)= S0 (the initial stock of S). 
𝑇 = ?̅?, 𝑆 (𝑇) = 𝑆̅ 
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The current-value Hamiltonian is 
  𝐻𝑐 = 𝐷(𝑆)  +  𝐶(𝐴)  + µ(𝑋 −  𝐴 −  𝑔𝑆)   4 
Since D and C are strictly convex, the Hamiltonian is strictly convex in (S, A). Therefore, the 
following necessary conditions are also sufficient.  
𝐻𝐴
𝑐 = 𝐶′(𝐴)  − µ =  0       5 
𝑑(µ𝑒−𝑖𝑡 )
𝑑𝑡
= −𝐻𝑆
𝑐𝑒−𝑖𝑡 ⇒ ?̇?𝑒−𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖µ𝑒−𝑖𝑡 = −(𝐷′(𝑆)  − µ𝑔)𝑒−𝑖𝑡  6 
?̇? = −𝐷′(𝑆)  + µ(𝑖 +  𝑔)               7 
Ṡ =  𝑋 −  𝐴 −  𝑔𝑆       8 
The current-value costate variable (µ) is the marginal reduction in future damages and 
abatement costs from abating one unit now.  Thus, µ =  𝐶′ (𝐴)  balances the marginal benefit of 
current abatement against marginal costs.  Since µ is the shadow value of abating a unit of 
emissions, we can interpret it as the optimal tax on emissions. Graphically:  
 
Figure 1: Optimal Tax on Emissions 
 
Optimal Tx on Emissions form of tax is not in the strict sense. It could also include all effort 
(assume the effort can be measured) directed towards abatement i.e government policy 
favouring recycling 
 
The Steady State  
To identify the steady state we use the first three first order conditions and set 
𝑆 = µ =  0.  Take the costate equation first and solve, 
𝜇 ̇ =   −𝐷′(𝑆) + µ(𝑖 +  𝑔) =  0,  Which yields 
µ =
𝐷′(𝑆)
(𝑖 +  𝑔)⁄        9 
Now consider the state equation:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
( )  C A ′ 
A  
A ∗ 
µ 
∗  
µ  
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Ṡ =  𝑋 −  𝐴 −  𝑔𝑆       10 
Then, with µ =  𝐶′(𝐴) ,      
We have a system of three equations, with three unknowns (S, A,µ).  The solution to these is 
the steady state (S s, As,µs).   
To illustrate the solutions in two dimension, focus on µ and S for which µ= 0. Note that; 
 
∂µ
∂𝑆⁄ = 𝐷′′(𝑆) (𝑖 +  𝑔) > 0⁄  Graphically,    11 
 
Figure 2: Relationship between µ And S For Which ?̇?=0 
 
GivenṠ =  𝑋 −  𝐴 − 𝑔𝑆 = 0, 
To get µ, note first that Ṡ =  𝑋 −  𝐴 −  𝑔𝑆= 0 implies  
𝐴 =  𝑋 −  𝑔𝑆        12 
In the steady state, µ= C′(A) and𝐴 =  𝑋 −  𝑔𝑆 
µ =  𝐶′(𝑋 −  𝑔𝑆)       13 
And this equation collects all combinations of µ and S for which Ṡ = 0                
∂µ ∂𝑆 ⁄ = −𝐶′′(𝑋 −  𝑔𝑆)  < 0.  Graphically: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
µs  
Ss 
( 0)  S = Ṡ = 0 
( 0)  ?̇? = 
S  
 
 
 
 
 
( 0)  ?̇? = 
S  
µ  
µ 
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The steady-state value of µ and S are determined as the simultaneous solution to  
µ = 𝐷′(𝑆)  + µ(𝑖 +  𝑔)  =  0,       [?̇?= 0],      14 
µ =  𝐶′(𝑋 −  𝑔𝑆),   [𝑆̇= 0].       15 
The steady-state level of abatement is determined easily with the state equation  
?̇? =  𝑋 −  𝐴 − 𝑔𝑆 = 0; that is, 𝐴𝑆 = 𝑋 −  𝑔𝑆𝑠 
 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS—A PHASE DIAGRAM  
One of the most interesting aspects about steady-state analysis is the analysis of how µ, S, and 
A move toward the steady state.  To do this we construct a phase diagram by examining how µ 
moves when the system is away from ?̇?= 0 and doing the same with S . 
Begin with µ: 
?̇? = ?̇?(𝑆, µ) =  −𝐷′(𝑆) + µ(𝑖 +  𝑔).     16 
Note that  
∂?̇? ∂𝑆 ⁄ =  − 𝐷′′(S)  <  0         
Consider a pair (𝑆̅ , µ̅ )such that ?̇? = 0 .  That is,  
𝜇 ̇ = 𝜇 ̇ = (𝑆̅  , µ̅) = − D’(𝑆̅)  +  µ̅𝑖 +  𝑔)  =  0     17 
Leaveµ = µ̅, but consider𝑆0 <  ?̅?.  Since ∂?̇? ∂𝑆 <  0 ⁄ and ?̇? (𝑆̅, µ̅ ) = 0, then ?̇?(𝑆0, µ̅ ) > 0 For 𝑆1 >
𝑆̅, 𝜇  ̇ (𝑆1, µ̅ ) < 0. Graphically:   
 
Figure 3: Movements of ?̇? with Different Values of S 
 
Thus, for pairs (µ,S) above ?̇? = 0, ?̇? > 0. For every (µ,S) below ?̇? = 0, ?̇? < 0.  
Now consider Ṡ away from Ṡ = 0.  Take the state equation ?̇? =  𝑋 −  𝐴 − 𝑔𝑆.  We need this in 
terms of µ, so consider µ =  𝐶ˈ(𝐴).  Since C′ is strictly increasing (C′′ >0), it has an inverse that is 
also strictly increasing.  Let (𝐶′) − 1 =  ℎ.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
1  S  0 S  
 
0) ( >  
<0)  ( 
 < 
( 0)  = ?̇? 
S  
µ  
 
µ̅ 
𝑆̅ 
?̇?
 
= 
?̇? 
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Then  
Ṡ =  Ṡ(𝑆, µ)  =  𝑋 −  ℎ(µ)  −  𝑔𝑆,      18 
with  ∂Ṡ ∂µ⁄ = ℎ′(µ)  <  0      19 
 
Take a pair (S′,µ′) such that  
Ṡ(𝑆′, µ′)  =  𝑋 −  ℎ(µ′)  −  𝑔𝑆′ =  0     20 
 
Fix 𝑆 =  𝑆′ and consider µ0 <  µ′.  Since ∂Ṡ ∂µ⁄ <  0  and Ṡ(𝑆′, µ′)  =  0, then Ṡ(𝑆′, µ′) > 0. For  
µ1 > µ′, Ṡ(𝑆′, µ1) <  0,  
Graphically:  
 
Figure 4: Relationship between µ and S, Showing Movements in Ṡ with different Values of µ 
 
 
Therefore, for any (µ,S) above Ṡ = 0, Ṡ < 0. For any (µ,S) below Ṡ = 0, Ṡ > 0. Combining our 
findings about ?̇? and Ṡaway from?̇? =  Ṡ =  0  yields the following graph.  
The directional arrows (like           ) tell us the qualitative movement of (µ,S) away from or 
toward the steady state in each of the four regions of the diagram.  Given some initial stock of 
accumulative pollution, 𝑆0 ≠  𝑆𝑠, we can draw qualitative conclusions about the path of (µ,S) 
toward the steady state.  This will be particularly revealing for the µ− path, because this will be 
the path of the optimal tax on emissions (management strategy). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
( 0) < 
0) ( > 
1  
µ 
0 
µ  
µ s 
Ss  
( 0)  = 
S  
Ṡ 
Ṡ 
Ṡ 
Ṡ 
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Figure 5: Interaction between ?̇? and Ṡ to determine steady state µs and 𝑆𝑠 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 
Following graph, the paper assume that 𝑆0 < 𝑆𝑠, drawn the paths (a), (b) and (c), but only path 
(b) reaches the steady state.  Note that a tax policy that originates above µs - µ(0) > µs as for 
path (a) cannot reach the steady state.  Therefore the optimal initial tax must be below the 
steady state tax.  However, it cannot be too low likeµ(0) for path (c).  
Path (b) converges to the steady state.  Note the policy prescription: set the initial 
emissions tax lower than the steady state tax and increase it toward µs as time goes by.  This 
also implies that optimal abatement starts out relatively low and increases as the tax is 
increased [use µ= C′(A)].  Abatement is higher in later periods, because in present value terms it 
is cheaper to push it off into the future.  Of course, doing so has to be balanced against 
increased damage in earlier periods.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
0) ( =  
0) ( =   
S  
Ss 
,  0)  ( 0 ?̇?
 
> < 
0 ,  0)  < < 
0)  ,  0 ( > > 
0 ,  0) ( < > 
 
?̇? 
?̇? 
?̇? 
?̇? 
Ṡ 
Ṡ 
Ṡ 
Ṡ 
Ṡ 
µs 
 
 µ 
µ 
Ṡ 
?̇? Ṡ 
?̇? 
?̇? Ṡ 
µ 
0 
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Figure 6: Using movements towards the steady state, a, b, and c provide different evolution 
paths for different tax regimes. In a, the tax is too high, and in c the tax is too low.  
Scenario b provides the optimal tax. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Using the same phase-diagram we can draw the opposite conclusions if the initial stock is 
greater than the steady-state stock. In this case the initial tax is set higher than the steady state 
tax and the tax is decreased toward the steady state as time goes by. Consequently, abatement 
starts out relatively high and is gradually decreased as the system moves toward the steady 
state.  
The success of the social planner in managing any accumulative pollutant depends on 
the measures taken.  The social planner has to first consider the stock of pollutant – its 
evolution towards the steady state, the policy measure he deems appropriate for managing the 
accumulative pollutant and the policy prescription that will guide the attainment of the desired 
social outcome. Depending on the initial stock of the accumulative pollutant and its movement 
towards a steady state, the social planner should, by the analysis of the paper; 
 
 
( 0) =  
0) ( =  
( b  )
( c )  
( a  )
S  0 
S  
S  s 
Ṡ 
?̇? 
µs 
µ
µ 
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 Make sure that the initial pollution tax measure should not be above the steady state tax. 
 The initial optimal pollution tax measure for abatement should be below the steady state 
level of tax but not too low. This optimal Tax should be increased over time till it gets to µs. 
 This means that abatement will be relatively lower in earlier periods but will increase as the 
optimal tax is increased. 
 If the optimal tax measure for abatement is too low, the policy of having an initial optimal 
pollution tax below the steady state tax will not be effective. 
 
CONCLUSION 
From the above analysis, it becomes imperative that the social planner is laden with the task of 
providing an optimal control for managing accumulative pollutants in the society. The 
Hamiltonian model used to espouse possible policy paths in the paper can also be used in 
determining other social problems not restricted to accumulated pollutants. The paper has been 
able to derive a valid (both in the short and long time horizons) solution that the social planner 
can use to stymie growth in accumulative pollutants as well as inherent damages in form of loss 
in welfare to the society. 
The social planner’s strategy depends on the steady state stock of accumulative 
pollutants in the society. Once this is known, the social planner has the responsibility of 
postulating optimal tax on emissions of these pollutants and invariably the level of abatement. 
As seen in the model, the optimal tax policy is one which must be lower than the steady state of 
the stock pollutant, if and only if the present stock of accumulated pollutant is lower than the 
already established steady state. This implies that abatement will be lower in earlier periods and 
higher in later periods as pollutant tax increase. Conversely, if the present stock of accumulated 
pollutant is higher than the established steady state, abatement will be high in earlier periods 
(with an attendant high tax) and lower in later periods(lowering taxes).  
The limitation of this management strategy is the possibility of the tax levied of producers 
of accumulated stock pollutants being transferred to the consumers, especially low income 
consumers. Thus, revenues generated from the optimal abatement tax, can be used to reduce 
the incidence of the abatement tax to low income earners, if the generated revenues are 
prioritized for low income earners. Also, this optimal abatement tax strategy may be unable to 
differentiate, sources of the accumulated pollutants. This will lead to inefficiency, because a 
uniform abatement tax will be levied against all polluters, irrespective of their contributions 
towards the stock of pollutant. 
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